- Home
- Agencies
- Department of Agriculture
- Department of Housing and Urban Development
- General Services Administration
- Department of Commerce
- Department of the Interior
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- Department of Defense
- Department of Justice
- National Science Foundation
- Department of Education
- Department of Labor
- Office of Personnel Management
- Department of Energy
- Department of State
- Small Business Administration
- Environmental Protection Agency
- Department of Transportation
- Social Security Administration
- Department of Health and Human Services
- Department of the Treasury
- U.S. Agency for International Development
- Department of Homeland Security
- Department of Veterans Affairs
- Goals
- Initiatives
- Programs
Primary tabs
Key to Changes
This text is Revised text
This word has been added to the text
This text is Last Published text
This word has been removed from the text
Modifed styling with no visual changes
Under Secretary: Lieutenant General Frank G. Klotz, USAF (Ret)Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and AdministratorNational Nuclear Security Administration
Key Leader: Dr. Donald CookDeputy Administrator for Defense ProgramsNational Nuclear Security Administration
Philip T. CalbosPrincipal Assistant Deputy Administrator for Defense ProgramsNational Nuclear Security Administration
FY 14-15: Agency Priority Goal
Maintain and modernize the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and dismantle excess nuclear weapons to meet the national security requirements, as assigned by the President, through the Nuclear Posture Review.
Priority Goal
Goal Overview
The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) ensures that nuclear warheads and bombs in the United States (U.S.) nuclear weapons operationally-deployed stockpile are safe, secure, reliable (effective), and available to the President for deployment. Until the world is free of nuclear weapons, the U.S. will assess and maintain a safe, secure, and effective stockpile that deters adversaries and assures allies that they are covered by the U.S. nuclear deterrent umbrella. However, because these weapons will exist for an indefinite period, the U.S. must manage its stockpile while meeting the overarching objectives of: 1) Providing no new military capabilities; 2) Conducting no underground nuclear tests; 3) Requiring no production of new fissile material for warheads; and 4) Contributing to U.S. nonproliferation goals. The NNSA shares responsibilities with the Department of Defense (DoD) for the implementation of actions that follow from the President's Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Memorandum and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. Our nation's nuclear weapons are exceeding their stockpile design life and their lifespan must be extended while maintaining the weapons’ safety, security, and effectiveness. At the same time, the NNSA must confront challenges arising from the loss of original manufacturing capabilities, specialized labor skills, and certification without returning to underground nuclear testing. These life extensions cannot be allowed to degrade the historically high confidence levels that underpin our nuclear deterrent.
Key Barriers and Challenges:
- The NNSA is committed to the national security requirement to meet the immediate needs of the stockpile while maintaining the basic research and development, technology, and production infrastructure to respond to technical and geopolitical surprise. The NNSA underpins both confidence in the stockpile and reinforcement of the DoD and other national security interests.
- To fulfill NNSA's commitment to DoD and the nation, the NNSA works together with its DoD partner to identify priorities and make the appropriate adjustments to scope and schedule that will achieve the goals of the President and the NPR.
- NNSA must conduct surveillance and annual assessments as the nuclear weapons stockpile ages. If technical surprises were to occur, the nation must have safe and secure facilities and the science and engineering base to respond. Infrastructure modernization delays continue to challenge NNSA's ability to maintain nuclear surveillance and assessment capability.
- NNSA must continue to meet facility safety and security requirements and work to achieve efficiencies where possible.
- The nation must maintain an unequaled capability to understand the design and physics of any nuclear device. This understanding extends beyond the stewardship of our own stockpile and includes an ability to analyze and effectively respond to any nuclear threat.
- The highly-skilled workforce that designed, tested, produced, and manufactured weapons which entered the stockpile needs to be replaced with the next generation of designers, engineers, and scientists trained in the unique capabilities required and armed with adequate tools and production facilities to steward the nuclear weapons stockpile as it evolves.
Stakeholder Engagement:
Management of this priority goal will require close coordination with the Department of Defense (DoD). The DoD and the NNSA share joint responsibility for all U.S. nuclear weapons. Part of keeping the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile safe, secure, and reliable includes working with the DoD to maintain the quantity and quality of weapons necessary for U.S. national security needs. From the earliest days of the Manhattan Project, the DoD and NNSA have maintained a set of joint programs to maintain the U.S. nuclear stockpile and counter the threat of nuclear proliferation.
Strategies
The strategies for achieving the NNSA's mission have led to the formulation of specific executable actions that will achieve the near-term and long-term requirements of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP). The annual NNSA SSMP, along with the Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Memorandum and its flow down to the Defense Programs Production and Planning Directive (P&PD), document these actions. Management tools for tracking performance, cost, and schedules provide programmatic controls of execution of stockpile stewardship activities across a geographically distributed Nuclear Security Enterprise (eight Management and Operations (M&O) contractor-operated national laboratories and production sites). Additionally, NNSA intends to meet the requirements of U.S. Code Title 50, Sections 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525 and 2451 requesting reporting on Stockpile Stewardship, Stockpile Management, Stockpile Stewardship Criteria and Assessment Methods, and Modernization and Refurbishment of the Nuclear Security Complex.
Progress Update
In 2015, the Agency with its M&O partners continues to support the Nuclear Weapons Council’s approved “3+2” strategy (a stockpile composed of three ballistic missile warheads and two air-carried warheads) with budget driven adjustments. This strategy supports an enduring commitment to the public to sustain a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent for America and to prudently base that deterrent on a safer, smaller, and more cost efficient stockpile of nuclear weapons.
Annual percent of warheads in the Stockpile that is safe, secure, reliable, and available.
- The key measure (indicator), “annual percentage of warheads in the stockpile that is safe, secure, reliable, and available to the President for deployment” was met. During the fourth quarter the National Laboratories issued the final Cycle 20 Annual Assessment Reports (AARs) for each weapon system in the stockpile. Additionally, the National Laboratories issued the 2015 Annual Assessment Letters that discusses the current state and health of the stockpile in preparation for the FY 2015 Report on Stockpile Assessments to the President.
Complete the dismantlement of all weapons systems in excess to stockpile requirements per approved annual schedule published in the Planning and Production Directive (P&PD), Program Control Document (PCD), and Requirements and Planning Document (RPD) “annual” documentation with a goal of balancing dismantlement work by mitigating gaps in future stockpile reductions.
- During 4Q, the Agency made plans to increase dismantlement activities in response to Secretary Kerry’s announcement that the President will seek to accelerate dismantlement by 20%. However, NNSA contractors fell behind the target of 100% dismantlements scheduled to be completed in FY 2015. Adverse weather, safety, management, the Pantex Metal Trades Council strike, and authorization reviews all delayed scheduled dismantlement activities and NNSA did not meet its dismantlement target for FY 2015. Although Weapons Dismantlement and Disposition (WDD) is behind schedule for 2015, NNSA expects to achieve the 2022 commitment. This result is important because it demonstrates NNSA’s commitment to the President’s vision for reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons. As defined by the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), this target is a concrete demonstration of meeting our Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Article VI obligation to make progress toward nuclear disarmament.
The percentage of steady state W76-1 Life Extension Program (LEP) planned builds equal to the percentage of allocated funding as represented in the annual Selected Acquisition Report (SAR).
- The Agency achieved 85% of the annual target of producing 100% of allocated War Reserve (WR) unit builds of the Nuclear Weapons Council-approved W76-1 Life Extension Program as represented in the annual Selected Acquisition Report. NNSA successfully recovered behind schedule production deliverables at the end of June 2015 due to Mass Properties testing and safety basis issues. However, the W76-1 LEP did not meet the FY 2015 production baseline due to several production issues and the Pantex Metal Trades Council strike, which arose after achievement of the production recovery in June 2015. NNSA is developing a plan to recover the FY 2015 production shortfall in FY 2016. The Agency completed its deliveries of WR units to the Navy through September 2015 in accordance with the negotiated Defense Programs and Navy delivery schedule without impact to the Navy’s fleet deployment schedules.
Weapons Quarterly FY 2015 Milestones Status:
Q4: - Not Met - Meet W80-1 NG First Production Unit (FPU) by August 2015 and begin shipments to Pantex in accordance with the Limited Lifetime Component Exchange (LLCE) PCD.
- The W80-1 NG FPU of August 2015 was not met as scheduled due to a qualification issue on the MC4886 detonator. Although no weapons will become non-operational, the result is a slip of the W80-1 NG FPU to December 2016, impacting W80 ALT 369.
Q4: - Met - Meet W78, 87, 76-1 NG Quarterly production and monthly shipments in accordance with NIPP & Directive Schedules.
- As of Sept 2015, all W78, W87 and W76-1 NG production and monthly shipments met Limited Life Component (LLC) Production Component Development requirements.
Q4: - Met - B61-12 LEP Design Reviews – Complete Q4 component baseline design reviews and successfully pass through Q4 component Pre-Production Engineering Gates to enable on time completion of All-Up Round Baseline Design Review in Q2 FY 2016.
- Completed by September 2015 all scheduled component baseline design reviews to enable the completion of the All-Up Round Baseline Design Review gates scheduled for Q2 FY 2016.
Q4: - Met - Conduct B61-12 LEP Flight Test - Support first development flight test with an operational flight test asset to test completion in accordance with the Test Plan.
- Conducted the first of three developmental flight tests on 1 July 2015 in support of the Baseline Design Review scheduled for Q2 FY 2016.
Q4: - Met - B61-12 LEP Hydrodynamic Test - Complete hydrodynamic test successfully at LANL Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility in accordance with the Test Plan.
- Completed the B61-12 hydrodynamic test in accordance with the Test Plan on 29 July 2015.
This APG is being replaced with a new APG for FY16-17. The new APG and milestones will be published when final approval is granted.
Next Steps
No Data Available
Expand All
Performance Indicators
Annual percent of the Stockpile that is safe, secure, reliable and available.
Complete the dismantlement of all weapons systems retired prior to 2009 per approved annual schedule published in the P&PD, PCDs, and RPD annual documentation.
The percentage of steady state W76-1 Life Extension Program (LEP) planned builds equal to the percentage of allocated funding as represented in the annual Selected Acquisition Report (SAR).
Contributing Programs & Other Factors
Office of Defense Programs
NNSA Defense Programs allocates and budgets funding in eight program areas: Directed Stockpile Work; Science Campaign; Engineering Campaign; Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign; Readiness Campaign; Inertial Confinement Fusion Ignition and High Yield Campaign; Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities; Secure Transportation Asset. These programs support sustainment of: 1) the stockpile; 2) the science, technology, and engineering (ST&E) base; and 3) the production and ST&E physical infrastructure to ensure the nation's stockpile is safe, secure, and reliable. These programs work in unison to allow the top national laboratories and production plants to assess the current stockpile, complete life extension programs, dismantle retired weapon systems, and provide weapon reliability factors to the DoD. The NNSA Office of Defense Programs provides the nation's nuclear deterrent.
Department of Defense
The NNSA works in partnership with the Department of Defense (DoD) through the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) and its subgroups, such as the Standing and Safety Committee (NWCSSC), the Transformation Coordinating Committee, and Project Officer Groups. Through these and other groups, NNSA partners with DoD (Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Navy, Air Force, and US Strategic Command) to ensure the weapons provided to the DoD meet its requirements.
Key deliverables developed jointly with DoD include the Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Memorandum (NWSM) and accompanying Requirements and Planning Document (RPD), the Report on Stockpile Assessment (ROSA), the Joint Surety Report (JSR), and the NWC Chairman's Annual Report to Congress (CARC). These classified products provide the planning and execution direction to the Nuclear Security Enterprise, as well as status updates to Congress.
NNSA also works with the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defense and the Atomic Weapons Establishment in accordance with the 1958 Mutual Defense Agreement.
Strategic Objectives
Strategic Objective:
Statement:
Maintain the safety, security and effectiveness of the nation’s nuclear deterrent without nuclear testing
Description:
In order to reassure allies and deter potential adversaries as long as nuclear weapons exist, the U.S. must sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. NNSA will continue to work closely with the Department of Defense (DoD), through the Joint DoD/DOE Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), to modernize the stockpile through timely execution of approved life extension programs, as outlined in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP). The SSMP, which is updated annually, details the 25-year program of record for activities supporting the nuclear weapons stockpile. The SSMP, as well as the NWC, is informed by NNSA technical scoping studies, cost and risk analysis, and resource allocation modeling of alternatives.
As the nation’s nuclear weapons age and exceed their stockpile design life, the NNSA must extend their lifespan. The 2010 NPR report, an extensive review of the nation’s nuclear posture, recommended that study options for weapon life extension programs (LEP) consider three approaches: refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components. The NPR report recommended fully funding the ongoing LEP for the W76 submarine-based warhead, the LEP study and follow-on activities for the B61 bomb, and to initiate a study of LEP options for the W78 intercontinental ballistic missile warhead, including the possibility of reusing the warhead on submarine-launched ballistic missiles to reduce the number of warhead types.
Without recourse to nuclear testing, NNSA will deliver the scientific capability to assess weapon performance as well as the component and manufacturing technologies and supporting infrastructure required to execute the SSMP. NNSA will ensure the safe and secure transportation of nuclear materials and weapons components. At the same time, NNSA will advance the President’s vision for reductions in nuclear weapons by dismantling retired weapons.
Agency Priority Goals
Statement: In support of this goal, DOE will:
Description: The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) ensures that nuclear warheads and bombs in the United States (U.S.) nuclear weapons operationally-deployed stockpile are safe, secure, reliable (effective), and available to the President for deployment. Until the world is free of nuclear weapons, the U.S. will assess and maintain a safe, secure, and effective stockpile that deters adversaries and assures allies that they are covered by the U.S. nuclear deterrent umbrella. However, because these weapons will exist for an indefinite period, the U.S. must manage its stockpile while meeting the overarching objectives of: 1) Providing no new military capabilities; 2) Conducting no underground nuclear tests; 3) Requiring no production of new fissile material for warheads; and 4) Contributing to U.S. nonproliferation goals. The NNSA shares responsibilities with the Department of Defense (DoD) for the implementation of actions that follow from the President's Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Memorandum and the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. Our nation's nuclear weapons are exceeding their stockpile design life and their lifespan must be extended while maintaining the weapons’ safety, security, and effectiveness. At the same time, the NNSA must confront challenges arising from the loss of original manufacturing capabilities, specialized labor skills, and certification without returning to underground nuclear testing. These life extensions cannot be allowed to degrade the historically high confidence levels that underpin our nuclear deterrent. Key Barriers and Challenges: Stakeholder Engagement: Management of this priority goal will require close coordination with the Department of Defense (DoD). The DoD and the NNSA share joint responsibility for all U.S. nuclear weapons. Part of keeping the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile safe, secure, and reliable includes working with the DoD to maintain the quantity and quality of weapons necessary for U.S. national security needs. From the earliest days of the Manhattan Project, the DoD and NNSA have maintained a set of joint programs to maintain the U.S. nuclear stockpile and counter the threat of nuclear proliferation.
